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ON THE CUSP OF THE NEXT
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
INSURANCE CRISIS
PHILIP G. PETERS, JR.*
ABSTRACT
Medical malpractice claims are dwindling. Total payouts are far lower now
than they were during the 2002 crisis. Yet, insurance industry profits have been
sinking for a decade and are nearly in the red. After a dozen years with a “soft”
insurance market, we are now on the cusp of yet another malpractice insurance
crisis. But how can profits be in peril if claims have dwindled and payouts are
historically low? Answering that question requires an understanding of the
insurance cycle which periodically transforms gradual increases in costs and
gradual decreases in revenue into explosive increases in premiums.
The industry’s financial statistics today eerily resemble those leading into
the 2002 crisis. However, some important differences also exist. The coronavirus
pandemic introduces a variable that makes the current transition from a soft
market to a hard one unique. In addition, industry representatives have
recognized the signs of a hardening market earlier in the transition than they have
in the past which may enable them to engineer a less painful transition from a
soft market to a hard one.
The stakes are high. After each of the three prior crises, physicians,
hospitals, and insurers descended on state capitals while lawmakers responded
with waves of restrictive tort reform. This Article explains how we have come to
sit on the cusp of a fourth medical malpractice crisis and examines the factors
that will determine how soft our landing will be.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The profits of medical malpractice insurers have nearly disappeared in the
last several years.1 After years of decline, premiums are now rising, and industry
experts warn that the market is hardening. In addition, experts worry that the
© 2022 Philip G. Peters, Jr.
* Ruth L. Hulston Professor Emeritus of Law, School of Law, University of Missouri.
Petersp@missouri.edu.
1. See infra text accompanying notes 28, 39–45 and 148–167 (profits falling) and 108 (policyholder
rates increasing).
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COVID-19 pandemic has placed difficult burdens on overstretched health care
providers—burdens that could lead to medical errors and more malpractice
claims.2 Yet, medical malpractice claims3 and the number of paid claims have
declined steadily for most of the last fifteen years.4 The total amount paid to settle
claims is thirty-six percent below its peak in 2002.5 So, how can we be headed
for another medical malpractice insurance crisis?
The answer lies in the mechanics of the insurance cycle. During the intense
competition of a “soft market,” carriers keep premiums down to acquire and
retain customers.6 Although this eventually leads to dangerously low profits,
carriers keep premiums low to preserve market share.7 Eventually, the pressure
on profits becomes so strong that carriers across the sector raise premiums
dramatically, creating a new “hard market” and causing cries of pain and outrage
from hospitals and physicians.8 Since the rise of modern medical malpractice
litigation in the 1960’s, this cycle has produced a malpractice insurance crisis
every ten or fifteen years.9
During the 1974–78 hard market, California physicians went on a fourweek strike, “causing public hospitals to overflow with patients” and leading to
“a number of ‘job actions’ in other states.”10 In the 1985–86 hard market, many

2. See infra text in Part IV.D (discussing pandemic associated risks of error).
3. See infra text accompanying notes 28 (indicating that claims have declined). See also Medical
Malpractice, INS. INFO. INST. (2012), https://www.iii.org/issue-update/medical-malpractice (reporting
that the Ohio Department of Insurance found that from 2005 to 2012, total annual medical malpractice
claims steadily decreased from 5,000 to 2,000).
4. See infra text accompanying notes 28 (indicating that paid claims have declined); Adam C.
Schaffer et al., Rates and Characteristics of Paid Malpractice Claims Among US Physicians by Specialty,
1992-2014, 177 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 710, 710 (2017) (“From 1992-1996 to 2009-2014, the rate of paid
claims decreased by 55.7%. . .”).
5. See infra Fig. 3 and accompanying text.
6. Brian Marx, Hard Market vs. Soft Market: The Insurance Industry’s Cycle and Why We’re
Currently in a Hard Market, PSA FIN., https://www.psafinancial.com/2013/01/hard-market-vs-softmarket-the-insurance-industrys-cycle-and-why-were-currently-in-a-hard-market/ (last visited Nov. 22,
2021).
7. See Richard G. Roberts, Understanding the Physician Liability Insurance Crisis, 8 FAM. PRAC.
MGMT. 47, 48 (2002) (stating that medical malpractice insurance companies discounted their premiums
below actuarial risk in order to obtain or preserve market share).
8. See Harming Patient Access to Care: The Impact of Excessive Litigation: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 107th Cong. 12 (2002) (statement of
Travis Plunkett, Legislative Director, Consumer Federation of America) (finding that each time the cycle
turns from a soft to a hard market the response by insurers is shifting from inadequate underpricing to
unconscionable over pricing, cutting back on coverage and blaming large jury verdicts for the problem
even though the crisis is caused by the insurers themselves).
9. See generally James R. Posner, Trends in Medical Malpractice Insurance, 1970–1985, 49 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 37 (1986) (discussing the medical malpractice insurance crisis of 1970 and 1985).
10. J. ROBERT HUNTER ET AL., CONSUMER FED’N OF AMERICA & CTR. FOR JUST. & DEMOCRACY,
HOW THE CASH-RICH INSURANCE INDUSTRY FAKES CRISES AND INVENTS SOCIAL INFLATION 36 (2020)
(quoting Malpractice ‘job actions’ spread, FACTS ON FILE WORLD NEWS DIG. (1975)).
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providers could not find coverage at any price.11 Time Magazine ran a cover
story, “Sorry, America, Your Insurance has been Canceled,”12 and Congress held
hearings.13 During the most recent 2002–06 hard market, doctors again went on
strike.14 The president of the American Medical Association (AMA), Richard
Corlin, claimed that limits on injured patients’ rights to sue were needed because
“[m]any practitioners, both generalists and specialists, just can’t afford the
liability premiums, forcing them to retire early, limit their practice, or relocate.”15
After the first crisis in the mid-1970’s, at least half of the states responded
with major tort reform legislation.16 After the mid-1980’s hard market, forty-six
states enacted new or additional restrictions.17 And after the third crisis in 2002–
06, half of the states passed additional tort reforms which included new or lower
damage caps.18 In 2021, we are now on the cusp of yet another malpractice
insurance crisis. While the financial statistics eerily resemble those leading into
the 2002 crisis, some differences do exist. Perhaps most importantly, the
coronavirus pandemic introduces a variable that makes the current transition
from a soft market to a hard one unique.
This Article explains how we have come to sit on the cusp of a fourth
medical malpractice crisis and examines the factors that will determine how soft
our landing will be.
II. NEW HARD MARKET IS EMERGING
Profits have fallen to dangerous levels in the medical professional liability
(MPL) insurance sector and premiums are increasing.19 The most pointed
warnings come from publications that follow the insurance industry.20 By using
11. Id. at 35.
12. Id. (citing George J. Church, Nation: Sorry Your Policy is Canceled, TIME, March 24, 1986, at
1–14).
13. Id. (citing The Liability Insurance Crisis, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Econ. Stabilization
of the H. Comm. on Banking, Fin., and Urban Affs., 99th Cong. (1986)).
14. See, e.g., Bruce Bartlett, Doctors on Strike, TOWNHALL (Feb. 28, 2003, 12:00 AM),
https://townhall.com/columnists/brucebartlett/2003/02/28/doctors-on-strike-n744655
(stating
that
numerous doctors are going on strike to protest high medical malpractice premiums).
15. HUNTER ET AL., supra note 10, at 39 (quoting AMA: To campaign for Malpractice Tort Reform,
AM. HEALTH LINE (2002)).
16. Id. at 44, 48.
17. Id. at 55.
18. Id. at 59.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 28, 39–45 and 148–167 (profits falling) and 108 (policyholder
rates increasing).
20. See generally Medical Malpractice Insurance, NAT’L ASS’N OF INSURANCE COMM’RS,
https://content.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_medical_malpractice_insurance.htm (Nov. 16, 2021); MEDICAL
LIABILITY MONITOR, https://medicalliabilitymonitor.com (last visited Nov. 22, 2021); Medical Liability
Research, AMA ASS’N., https://www.ama-assn.org/practice-management/sustainability/medicalliability-market-research (last visited Nov. 22, 2021) (publications that follow medical malpractice
liability insurance).
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phrases such as “the reckoning is here”21 and “the good times are ending,”22
industry observers have concluded that a hard market is coming.23 Many have
concluded that premiums are climbing and are under pressure to continue to
climb.24 Matt Gracey, the CEO of malpractice insurance broker Danna-Gracey,
believes that policyholder rate increases in the 5% range for smaller groups are
on the lower end of the scale.25 And large multispecialty groups have seen their
rates go up by as much as 100% over the last eighteen months.26 Mr. Gracey adds
that “every A-rated carrier specializing in malpractice insurance now is running
a combined loss ratio of over 100%, meaning that for every dollar of premium
they bring in they’re paying out more than a dollar, which means they have to
raise their rates.”27
These worries are not just hype from the media and public relations
consultants; they are shared by the most respected authorities in the field of
liability insurance. Both the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
(NAIC) and industry analyst AM Best warn of trouble ahead.28 In 2019,
according to the NAIC, the industry combined ratio—a key measure of
profitability—reached its worse level in a decade.29 In its April 2020 report, the

21. Katie Dwyer, The Reckoning is Here for the Liability Market. Here’s What Will Change, RISK &
INS. (Dec. 21, 2018), https://riskandinsurance.com/the-reckoning-is-here-for-the-medical-professionalliability-market-heres-what-will-change/.
22. Jeffrey Bendix, What’s happening with costs and claims in the wake of COVID-19, MED. ECON.
J., Oct. 13, 2020, at 10.
23. Susan J. Forray & Chad C. Karls, A Hardening Market Arrives in Time to Greet a Global
Pandemic, INSIDE MED. LIAB.: MED. PRO. LIAB. ASS’N, 2020, at 46 (“The year 2019 marked a turning
point for medical professional liability.”); The Current State of the Medical Malpractice Market, PRAC.
OF MED., MAGMUTUAL (Jan. 15, 2020), https://www.magmutual.com/learning/article/current-statemedical-malpractice-market/ (“[T]he medical malpractice segment is transitioning back to a hard
market.”); Observers Say Medical Liability Market Beginning to Harden as Higher Jury Awards, Eroding
Tort Reform Sink In, BEST’S NEWS & RSCH. SERV., AM BEST INFO. SERVS. (Dec. 23, 2019, 1:52 PM),
https://news.ambest.com/newscontent.aspx?refnum=222664&altsrc=9 (“In 2019, the market transitioned
to a hardening market.”); The Property/Casualty Underwriting Cycle (Shallower Market Peaks and
Valleys
Ahead),
SPECIAL REP., FITCH RATINGS
(Nov.
13,
2019,
3:19
PM),
https://www.fitchratings.com/research/insurance/the-property-casualty-underwriting-cycle-shallowermarket-peaks-valleys-ahead-13-11-2019 (“The P/C market is in a hardening pricing phase…”).
24. Gloria Gonzalez, Medical malpractice insurers under pressure: Best, BUS. INS. (May 7, 2019),
https://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20190507/NEWS06/912328310/Medicalmalpracticeinsurers-under-pressure-AM-Best-report%203.
25. Bendix, supra note 22, at 12.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See NAT’L ASS’N OF INSURANCE COMM’RS, REPORT ON PROFITABILITY BY LINE BY STATE 149
(2020) [hereinafter NAIC, PROFITABILITY 2020] (showing declining profitability in medical professional
liability); AM BEST, BEST’S MARKET SEGMENT REPORT: US MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY
INSURANCE MARKET REMAINS IN FLUX 1 (2020) (indicating that the medical professional liability segment
faces a negative outlook for 2020).
29. NAT’L ASS’N OF INSURANCE COMM’RS, U.S. PROPERTY & CASUALTY AND TITLE INDUSTRIES:
2019 FULL YEAR RESULTS 6 (2020) [hereinafter NAIC, PROPERTY 2020].
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Commissioners conclude that “medical professional liability writers enter the
pandemic in the worst financial position in over a decade.”30
An equally pessimistic report came from AM Best—a highly respected
global credit rating agency specializing in the insurance industry—in April
2020.31 AM Best announced a “negative” outlook for the medical professional
liability (MPL) sector in both 2020 and 2021 after the field had experienced
“notable deterioration” in 2019 and faced several challenges going forward.32 In
its view, the sector enters its “weakest point in almost two decades” and faces
“dim prospects for … profitability.”33 The pandemic has magnified these fears.
AM Best, in particular, has expressed serious concerns about the impact of
COVID-19 on medical errors and on the industry’s ability to implement planned
rate increases, as discussed further below.34
The villains for this new hard market have already been chosen. Since 2019,
industry publications have identified “nuclear verdicts”35 and “social inflation”36
as the culprits. But the facts point to a different culprit—the insurance cycle.37
A. Profits are Disappearing
According to NAIC, the industry’s profits have declined steadily since their
peak in 2010.38 Figure 1 shows the decline in profits using a common metric
called Profit on Insurance Transactions.39 It takes into account both premiums
and investment returns.40 Profit on insurance transactions peaked at 27.4% of
premiums in 2010 and has fallen since then to only 2% of premiums in 2019.41
This is the lowest level reported since the eve of the 2002 malpractice insurance
crisis, also shown in Figure 1.42

30. Id. at 15 (emphasis added).
31. About Us, AM BEST, https://www.ambest.com/about/index.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2021).
32. AM BEST, supra note 28, at 1.
33. Id. at 1, 3 (emphasis added).
34. Id. at 1; see infra text accompanying note 152.
35. E.g., Amy Buttell, Nuclear Verdicts Escalate: Verdicts rise as more awards exceed 100M, INSIDE
MED.
LIAB.
(2021),
https://www.mplassociation.org/Web/Publications/Inside_Medical_Liability/Issues/2021/Q1/Articles/N
uclear_Verdicts_Escalate_Verdicts.aspx.
36. HUNTER ET AL., supra note 10, at 16–18.
37. See infra Part III (explaining the mechanics of the insurance cycle).
38. NAIC, PROFITABILITY 2020, supra note 28.
39. Id.
40. NATL. ASS’N. OF INSURANCE COMM’RS., REPORT ON PROFITABILITY BY LINE BY STATE IN 2011,
at 5 (2012) [hereinafter NAIC, PROFITABILITY 2011] (“Profit on insurance transactions is equal to
underwriting profits plus investment gain on insurance transactions minus estimated related federal
income taxes.”). It is commonly expressed as a percent of premiums. Id.
41. See infra Fig.1 (using data from 2019 which is the last set of data reported by NAIC).
42. See infra Fig.1.
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If investment returns are set aside, the industry is already operating at a
loss. Its premiums do not cover its operating costs (which include the costs of
underwriting, selling, and settling claims), as shown in Figures 8 and 13, later in
this article.43 While Figure 1 shows that investment returns have preserved a 2%
overall profit for the industry as of 2019, that too will disappear if operating
losses continue to climb. These statistics explain why industry experts fear that
the long soft market is finally turning hard.
B. The Paradox: Medical Malpractice Claims are Declining
Medical malpractice litigation has been shrinking. Both the number of
claims made, and the number of claims paid have dropped far below their peaks.
Paid claims against physicians are now roughly half as frequent as they were
when the 2001 crisis began. Likewise, the total amount spent by insurers to
satisfy these claims dropped steadily from 2001 to 2010. Though the total spent
has grown since then, the rate of growth has paralleled consumer and medical
inflation. Here, too, the current levels are substantially below the levels from
2001.
1. A Sharp Drop in the Number of Claims
Patients are filing far fewer claims than they did before the last crisis.44 A
large 10-year analysis done by CRICO Strategies in 2018 found that claims
dropped 27% in the ten-year period between 2007 and 2016.45 The report
analyzed over 124,000 MPL claims and reflected the MPL experience of over
five-hundred hospitals and health care entities along with 180,000 physicians

43. NAIC, PROFITABILITY 2011, supra note 40, at 4.
44. See infra Fig. 8.
45. NAIC, PROFITABILITY 2011, supra note 40.

PETERS 04 (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

ON THE CUSP OF THE NEXT MED. MAL. INURANCE CRISIS

2/9/22 3:48 PM

139

from commercial and captive insurers nationwide, representing approximately
30% of all United States medical malpractice claims and suits.46 The report’s
authors called the decline “dramatic” and found that declines were “universal
across many segments of health care delivery.”47 Overall, the frequency of
litigation dropped from 5.1 cases per one hundred physicians to 3.7 cases.48
OB/GYNs benefited the most with claims dropping 44%.49
This decline has mixed implications. While it may be good news for
industry profits, it is a tragedy for victims of medical negligence since medical
errors are not also declining.50 Instead, pursuit of modest medical negligence
claims is becoming more difficult, as discussed further below. Before the recent
decline in claims, only a tiny fraction of negligently injured patients received any
compensation.51 Today, that fraction is even smaller.
2. A Declining Number of Paid Settlements
The number of paid claims against physicians and other health care
practitioners declined steadily from 2001 to 2016 and has remained steady since
then. As shown in Figure 2,52 reliable data from NPDB show that the number of
paid claims against all individual health care providers steadily declined after the
2001 crisis, shrinking from 19,772 paid claims in 2001 to 11,538 in 2019—a
drop of 42%. For physicians alone (not shown), the decline has been even
steeper, falling 47% between 2001 and 2019.53

46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 1.
Id. at 4.
Id.
CRICO STRATEGIES, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE IN AMERICA: A 10-YEAR ASSESSMENT WITH
INSIGHTS 4–5 (2018).
50. Id. at 12.
51. Medical Liability: New Ideas for Making the System Work Better for Patients: Hearing on S.
1337 Before the S. Comm. On Health, Educ., Lab., and Pensions, 109th Cong. 15 (2006) (statement of
David Studdert, Associate Professor of Law and Public Health, Harvard University).
52. See Data Analysis Tool, NAT’L PRAC. DATA BANK, https://www.npdb.hrsa.gov/analysistool/
(last visited Mar. 8, 2021) (providing the number of health claims between 2001 and 2019). All payments
made to settle claims against individual health care practitioners have been reportable to the NPDB since
1990. Id.
53. Id.
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Setting aside the low 2020 number as a pandemic aberration, the 2019
numbers are the lowest recorded since NPDB began collecting statistics in 1991,
amounting to 61% of the number of paid claims in that year.54 When the statistics
are adjusted to take population growth into account, the number of paid claims
for all practitioners is now less than half of what it was in 1991 (47%).
A detailed review of the NPDB data from 1997 to 2014 found that “[t]he
decrease occurred across all specialties, although the magnitude of the decline
varied markedly by specialty, and was significant in each specialty except
cardiology.” 55 The study found that in 2014 one paid claim was reported each
year for every one hundred physicians.56 By 2019, only one claim was paid for
every 28,572 Americans.57
These numbers, however, must be interpreted with some caution because
the NPDB data have a weakness that may understate the number of claims paid
on behalf of practitioners: payments on behalf of institutions, rather than
individuals, need not be reported to the NPDB.58 Some hospitals and health care
organizations have recently begun to shield their affiliated providers from an
adverse report to the data bank by settling a case with the understanding that
claims against individual providers will be dismissed.59 The extent of this
corporate shielding is not yet known.

54. Id.
55. Schaffer et. al., supra note 4, at 712.
56. See id. at 710 (taking the number of paid claims in 2014—8.9 per 1000 physicians—and dividing
it by ten).
57. Data Analysis Tool, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined..
58. Schaffer et al., supra note 4, at 714. Underreporting could also lead to an underestimation of
payouts. But a study using the files of a large malpractice insurer found only small discrepancy. Id. at 717.
59. Id. at 714.
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3. The Total Value of Settlements is Far Below Prior Levels and is Rising
Gradually
The two best sources of national data on the total value of malpractice
settlements are the data sets presented by NPDB and AM Best.
Figure 3 displays NPDB data showing a steady climb in both the nominal
and CPI-adjusted values of payouts from 1991 to 2001, leading up to the last
crisis, and then an equally steady decline in both nominal and CPI-adjusted
dollars from 2002 to 2010.60 The decline in nominal payouts ended around 2011,
but payouts in real dollars continued to fall until 2017.61 In both nominal and real
dollars, payouts reached their bottom in 2017 and then rose slightly in 2018 and
2019. In CPI-adjusted dollars, the total amount paid in 2019 accounted for only
64% of the total amount paid in 2001.
It is useful, at this juncture, to look back at Figure 1 and note that profits
began a steady descent in 2010 that has continued to the present day. Yet, Figure
3 shows that tort payout levels were stable between 2010 and 2017. The paradox
posed by these statistics will be discussed further in Parts III and IV.
As with the data on paid claims, corporate shielding may mean that NPDB
data failed to detect a recent rise in payouts. That risk is partially mitigated by
data from AM Best, shown in Figure 4,62 which indicates that real payouts by the

60. Data Analysis Tool, supra note 52.
61. Id.
62. HUNTER ET AL., supra note 10, at 24. See generally J. ROBERT HUNTER & JOANNE DOROSHOW,
AMERICANS FOR INSURANCE REFORM, STABLE LOSSES/UNSTABLE RATES 2016, at 15 (2016) (reporting
data used to create this figure). AM Best data for the last decade was provided to the author by AM Best
staff.
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insurers shrank markedly from 2003 to 2011 and have risen quite gradually since
then. The AM Best data, unlike the data from NPDB, include losses on liability
insurance policies purchased by hospitals and other health care organizations,
though it still does not include direct payments to claimants by self-insured
health care organizations.
In the AM Best data set, shown in Figure 4, total paid CPI-adjusted losses
in 2019 were 39% below their 2002 level.63 In fact, the real payout levels of the
last decade are the lowest since the early 1990s. When adjusted using the medical
inflation index, payout levels are at their lowest level since the early 1980s.

But in the AM Best data, unlike the NPDB data, average payments in
nominal dollars started rising in 2010–11,64 as shown in Figure 5.65 Since 2011,
nominal payments rose 3% annually,66 which is faster than consumer prices but
slightly slower than the medical inflation that drives settlement costs up. These
figures are consistent with the CRICO study of claims between 2007 and 2016,
which found that median settlements rose along with consumer inflation, and that
average payments outpaced consumer inflation but trailed medical inflation.67

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

See supra Fig. 4.
HUNTER ET AL., supra note 10, at 24; HUNTER & DOROSHOW, supra note 62, at 15.
Figure 5 was created with data shared by the CFA.
See infra Fig. 5.
CRICO STRATEGIES, supra note 49, at 8.
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As with the NPDB figures, this modest inflation-driven growth seems
insufficient to trigger a new hard market, especially considering today’s
historically low level of indemnity losses. Part III, however, will explain how the
messy mechanics of the insurance marketplace transform gradual increases in
nominal costs—costs that merely mirror inflation—into dramatic, sudden
increases in premiums. In the logic of the insurance cycle, a historically low level
of payouts is much less important than multiple years of declining profits,
whatever their cause.
4. Average Settlement Size, “Social Inflation,” and “Nuclear” Verdicts
Voices in the industry regularly point to the growth of “nuclear verdicts”
and the increasing severity of indemnity payments as the cause of declining
profits.68 One industry executive noted that “[o]ver the last three years there has
been a steady uptick in judgments exceeding $10 million, many coming in
venues not traditionally considered high risk.”69 In its annual survey,
ASHRM/Aon found a “continual increase in large claim frequency of claims

68. Buttell, supra note 35.
69. Dwyer, supra note 21. See also Todd Shryock, Which direction are malpractice rates headed
and why?, MED. ECON. (Sept. 27, 2019), https://www.medicaleconomics.com/view/which-direction-aremalpractice-rates-headed-and-why (noting both an increase and a surge in novel venues).
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greater than $5M.”70 The CRICO study also found an increase in high-indemnity
payments between 2007 and 2016, though it found they are “still rare.”71
The perception that “nuclear” verdicts are driving down industry profits has
given rise to complaints about “social inflation”—an alleged free-wheeling
public attitude toward compensatory damages. In the spring of 2019, when the
Consumer Federation of America (CFA) and the Center for Justice & Democracy
(CJ&D) reviewed the language being used in the press, they found that references
to nuclear verdicts and social inflation were still intermittent, but by late 2019,
the entire industry seemed to have “gotten the memo.”72 This terminology has
now made its way into the most respected industry publications. AM Best’s 2020
report noted that the “vast majority of MPL companies have begun to see a rise
in ‘nuclear’ verdicts and average indemnity losses that are much higher than
historical averages.” 73
But this focus on rising average verdicts and settlements is misleading in at
least four respects. First, total payouts determine industry profitability, not the
average size of individual settlements. In the case of medical malpractice
insurance, the number of payments has declined so markedly over the past twenty
years that total payouts are still lower than during prior hard markets and are
climbing at a rate lower than medical inflation.74
Second, “nuclear” verdicts certainly do occur, perhaps more often than in
the past and probably in new places.75 But these awards, which are not common,
are typically reduced, often substantially, by courts or in settlement before
payment.76 The CRICO study’s findings mirror this sentiment:
[E]xtraordinary jury awards draw media attention, pique the interest
of reinsurers, and can skew the focus of patient safety improvements,
but they remain rare. Per 1,000 cases closed, only one or two cases
closed with more than $5 million indemnity. Outlier payments (those
exceeding $11M) had a minimal impact on overall indemnity trends.77

70. Virginia Jones et al., Understanding Changes in the Medical Malpractice Insurance Market, in
AON/ASHRM HOSP. AND PHYSICIAN PRO. LIAB. BENCHMARK ANALYSIS 9, 9 (2019).
71. See CRICO STRATEGIES, supra note 49, at 9 (showing payments between $3 million and $11
million).
72. HUNTER ET AL., supra note 10, at 16.
73. AM BEST, supra note 28, at 23.
74. See infra Fig. 6.
75. See, e.g., Shryock, supra note 69 (“[W]e’re seeing, as an industry, more large verdicts in places
that have never had one like that.”).
76. David A. Hyman et al., Do Defendants Pay What Juries Award - Post-Verdict Haircuts in Texas
Medical Malpractice Cases, 1988–2003, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 3, 5–7 (2007); Neil Vidmar, Juries
and Medical Malpractice Claims Empirical Facts versus Myths, 467 CLINICAL ORTHOPEDICS & RELATED
RSCH. 367, 373 (2009).
77. HUNTER ET AL., supra note 10, at 39–40 (quoting CRICO STRATEGIES, supra note 49).
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Another industry publication observed that the largest verdicts do not “have
an overall statistical effect on losses.”78
Third, the rise in average payments can be fully explained by medical and
consumer inflation. Past and future medical expenses constitute a major
component of recoverable damages in medical malpractice cases, especially in
states that have capped pain and suffering damages.79 As a result, malpractice
awards and settlements are strongly influenced by medical inflation. According
to CRICO, the increase in median payment mirrors consumer inflation;
furthermore, average payouts are rising more slowly than medical inflation.80 As
noted above, the AM Best data for the last decade show the same trend.81 Since
none of the parties complaining about the climb in damages are advocating for a
cap on medical billing, it seems unfair to complain about payments that are
driven in large part by the medical bills incurred to treat negligently injured
patients.
Finally, the average settlement is rising because small medical malpractice
claims are disappearing. The top line in Figure 6 shows the declining number of
cases resolved for amounts under $500,000 in 2020 dollars.82 Since 2001, their
number has fallen 46%.

These smaller settlements have not been replaced by growth in larger
settlements. As shown in Figure 6, large settlements constitute a surprisingly
78. Shryock, supra note 69 (quoting Bill Fleming).
79. See AM BEST, supra note 28, at 7 (pointing out the role of “rising medical loss costs” in driving
loss ratios).
80. CRICO STRATEGIES, supra note 49, at 8.
81. See supra text accompanying note 66.
82. See supra Fig. 6.
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small fraction of all claims and have remained a small fraction over the entire
period.83 The middle line shows settlements between half a million and one
million dollars and the lowest line shows the number of settlements at or above
one million in 2020 dollars.84 Both categories have declined in frequency since
their peak in 2003–04.85 The number of settlements over one million in 2020
dollars has fallen by 38% since its peak in 2003.86
Small claims are also disappearing because malpractice cases have become
extremely expensive to litigate.87 As a result, plaintiffs’ attorneys are screening
their clients closely for large and readily proven economic loss.88 That has caused
an upward shift in the severity of claims being litigated which, in turn, should
drive up the dollar value of the average settlement substantially.
To recap, fewer cases are being filed than ever before and smaller cases are
dwindling dramatically, leading to fewer claims being resolved through
settlement. Total payouts are significantly lower in real dollars than they were
during the 2002 crisis. Why then is the malpractice insurance market hardening?
That requires an understanding of the insurance business cycle.
III. THE INSURANCE CYCLE
How can profits be in peril if claims have dwindled and payouts are much
lower than they were during the last hard market? Answering that question
requires an understanding of the insurance business cycle. As explained in this
Part III, the mechanics of the insurance business cycle explain why the turn from
a “soft” market into a “hard” market typically involves a very sharp spike in
premiums—so sharp that providers march on state capitals.
In the insurance cycle, relatively long soft markets with low premiums
swiftly transition into much briefer hard markets where premiums turn sharply
upward.89 Then the market softens and the cycle repeats itself. During the initial
years of the ensuing soft market, premiums are still high, and profits are too.90
Insurers can compete on price and still make robust profits due to the steep

83. See supra Fig. 6.
84. See supra Fig. 6.
85. See supra Fig. 6.
86. See supra Fig. 6.
87. NAIC, PROPERTY 2020, supra note 29, at 7 (“The complexity involved in discovering negligence
[for MPL claims] results in a higher percentage of premium going toward defense and cost containment
expenses”).
88. TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH 59 (Univ. of Chi. Press, 2005) [hereinafter
BAKER I]. See Schaffer et al., supra note 4, at 715 (noting that attorneys do not take small cases).
89. Tom Baker, Medical Malpractice and the Insurance Underwriting Cycle, 54 DEPAUL L.
REV. 393, 436 (2005) [hereinafter Baker II].
90. See infra text accompanying notes 92–94.
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premiums increase imposed during the panic of the hard market; in soft markets,
insurers want premium dollars to invest.91
Investment returns are an especially important benefit of the MPL business
model because MPL insurance has a longer gap between the sale of insurance
and the payment of claims than most other lines of property and casualty
insurance.92 MPL insurers compete for premium dollars to invest by offering low
prices and soft underwriting.93 In fact, low premiums largely define a soft
market.94
For a time, insurers can preserve profits by releasing surplus reserves that
were accumulated during the last hard market.95 At the peak of the 1975, 1986
and 2002 crises, for example, the industry overpredicted losses and, thus,
excessively raised reserves and premiums.96 This ultimately enabled insurers to
extend the ensuing soft markets by gradually releasing redundant reserves to
income.97
Figure 7 shows how the growth in reserves and premiums exceeded the
growth of paid losses in 2002–06, providing a surplus which consequentially
funded a soft market that has run from 2006 to the present.98 In Figure 7, by
comparing the steep increase in premiums and in reserves with the slight increase
in payouts, we see that both premiums and reserves rose more than eventually
was required.99 As a result, premiums could be reduced during the ensuing soft

91. Id.
92. BAKER I, supra note 88, at 47.
93. The Property/Casualty Underwriting Cycle, supra note 23 (“Hard markets are fleeting as
underwriting success attracts competition that leads to an erosion of favorable pricing conditions.”). See
also Sean Fitzpatrick, Fear is the Key: A Behavioral Guide to Underwriting Cycles, 10 CONN. INS. L. J.
255, 256 (2004) (explaining how insurers cut prices and loosen terms).
94. INS.
INFO.
INST.,
Market
Conditions:
Cycles
And
Costs,
https://www.iii.org/publications/commercial-insurance/how-it-functions/market-conditions-cycles-andcosts (last visited Sep. 9, 2021) (“The property/casualty (P/C) insurance industry cycle is characterized by
periods of soft market conditions, in which premium rates are stable or falling and insurance is readily
available, and by periods of hard market conditions, where rates rise, coverage may be more difficult to
find and insurers’ profits increase.”). Tom Baker distinguishes hard markets from soft markets by whether
premiums are above cost (hard) or below cost (soft). Baker II, supra note 89, at 396.
95. HUNTER ET AL., supra note 10, at 2 (“The excessive reserves of the previous hard market in the
early 2000s are still being released by insurers even as they spike current reserves to create false support
for price increases.”). See also BAKER I, supra note 88, at 50 (explaining how the release of surplus
reserves and strengthening of inadequate reserves affect profits).
96. See BAKER I, supra note 88, at 53–54 (showing data for 1986 and 2001, and noting reports about
1975, but not data); HUNTER ET AL., supra note 10, at 7 (“[T]he extended soft market we have been in is
also the result of excessive pricing and over-reserving that took place during the last hard market.”).
97. HUNTER ET AL., supra note 10, at 2.
98. See supra note 63 (citing the sources of data in this article from AM Best).
99. Id. Incurred losses are the sum of loss payments and new reserves for future payments. See BAKER
I, supra note 88, at 54 (noting the rise in incurred losses). Starting in 2001 and ending in 2005, incurred
losses rose well above paid losses, reflecting a dramatic jump in reserves. Id. NAIC data show the same
pattern: premiums and incurred losses rose far above paid losses. Id.
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market to compete for market share and reserves could be released into income,
thus preserving profits. The combination of the two revenue streams fueled the
long soft market that is now ending. This also happened during the 1986 crisis,
which suggests that this pattern is typical of the cycle rather than a circumstance
that is unique to the 2001 hard market.100

Eventually, however, excess reserves are exhausted.101 Meanwhile,
inflation increases the cost of claims payments and operating expenses.102 A soft
market nears its end when these rising costs intersect with shrinking real
premiums and the exhaustion of surplus reserves.103 During that time, insurers
are effectively selling coverage below cost.104 Their predicament becomes dire
when operational losses exceed investment returns, depleting surplus equity and
reducing carrier ability to write new policies and to invest.105 At this point,
insurers need to raise premiums and reserves as the market moves from soft to
hard.
Unfortunately for health care providers, the turn from a soft market to a
hard one has always been sharp.106 Afraid to be the first to raise premiums,
insurers have typically tolerated eroding profits for several years, letting the

100. BAKER I, supra note 88, at 53–54.
101. See SCOTT E. HARRINGTON, Tort Liability, Insurance Rates, and the Insurance Cycle, in
BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON FIN. SERVS. 97, 101 (Robert E. Litan & Richard Herring eds., The
Brookings Institution 2004) (declining profits leads to erosion of surplus).
102. See infra Part IV.B.1; Part IV.B.4.
103. See infra Part IV.B.1; Part IV.B.2.
104. See Baker II, supra note 89, at 396 (suggesting that selling below cost identifies a soft market).
105. HARRINGTON, supra note 101, at 119. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 93, at 261 (noting that robust
interest rates can lengthen a soft market).
106. See Baker II, supra note 89, at 416 (showing that the transition is sharp).
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pressure build.107 When the pressure on profits is no longer tolerable, premiums
spike, exploding like the cork in a bottle of poorly handled champagne.
Unsurprisingly, doctors and hospitals are outraged and mystified; they question
why the same coverage suddenly costs so much more.
The central puzzle of the insurance cycle is why carriers delay premium
increases long enough for a crisis to ensue.108 Tom Baker, a superb legal analyst
of insurance markets, offers an explanation that emphasizes the psychology of
insurance marketing and underwriting.109 Baker’s explanation also dovetails
nicely with the industry view that highly competitive soft markets force carriers
to keep premiums low. Due to this competition, when an insurer breaks from the
pack, they lose business and market share.
The story goes like this: when the soft market begins to lose its energy,
industry sales managers and sales staff are afraid to be the first to raise premiums
and lose market share.110 That fear puts pressure on the underwriters to keep their
predictions of future losses low.111 Low predictions of future losses keep reserve
gathering low, enabling low premiums that fuel sales.112 Indeed, these low
premiums may be perceived as vital to be competitive.113 This inclination is
reinforced with employee pay incentives that reward increases in market share
and the preservation of revenue, and do not reward calls for increased reserves
or premiums.114 These incentives extend all the way to the underwriters.115
Given the uncertainty associated with predicting future losses,116 there is
ample room for underwriter judgment to be affected. Consequently, carriers are
“too optimistic about future losses for too long.”117 The result is a “winners
curse” in which, the companies that win the market competition, have set prices
so low that they have put themselves in financial danger.118 Scott Harrington
offers the possibility that only a few “aberrant” carriers are needed to lead the

107. Id. at 417. See HARRINGTON, supra note 101, at 119 (explaining how the industry delays its
response).
108. HARRINGTON, supra note 101, at 119.
109. Baker II, supra note 89, at 417.
110. See BAKER I, supra note 88, at 56 (indicating a pressure to keep prices low).
111. Id. See also HARRINGTON, supra note 101, at 133 (noting revenue gains of the low-priced firms).
112. See Baker II, supra note 89, at 397 (explaining that insurers use these predictions to estimate the
level of reserves needed).
113. BAKER I, supra note 88, at 57.
114. Baker II, supra note 89, at 419–20. Even mutual companies are likely to have a bias toward
protection of market share. Id. at 420.
115. Id. at 418.
116. See generally Baker II, supra note 89 (indicating uncertainties including future claiming trends,
the severity of injuries which will lead to suits, the dollar value of those injuries to juries, the odds of new
medical developments that will increase malpractice claims, the rate of medical inflation, changes in legal
rules including the standard of care, any changes in the cost of defense, and future investment returns).
117. BAKER I, supra note 88, at 50.
118. Id. at 58; HARRINGTON, supra note 101, at 120.
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market down, generating the winners curse effects.119 As a result, other insurers
then feel obliged to follow the market down to preserve market share and
premium revenue.120
Underwriters may also be reluctant to render internally unpopular opinions
that differ from those being made by underwriters at other companies. Herd
mentality makes it seem much safer to wait until the rest of the pack is ready to
raise prices.121 Interestingly, the CFA and the CJ&D believe that today’s
widening chorus of warnings about a “hardening” market and “social inflation”
is one way carriers ask each other whether it is time to start raising premiums en
masse.122
This suggestion of group psychology and shared communication may also
provide a clue to one of the remaining mysteries of the insurance cycle: why are
the peaks and troughs of the insurance cycle so closely aligned across the many
lines of casualty insurance? Despite such disparate lines as auto, surety, fire,
crop, homeowners, inland marine, workers compensation, and product liability,
the overall Property and Casualty (P/C) industry has experienced nearly the same
ups and downs as medical malpractice insurance.123 Each spike in premiums for
the P/C industry perfectly matches one of the three crises in the medical
malpractice industry.
For the MPL sector, at least, the long soft markets seem attributable to the
success of optimistic sales forces over more pessimistic actuaries.124 During the
final stages of a soft market, new policies are underpriced and, to enable that,
under-reserved.125 This occurred before both the 1986 and 2002 hard markets.126
More realistic firms are destined to watch from the sidelines until the pressure
on the “winners” becomes unbearable. St. Paul’s withdrawal from the market on
the cusp of the 2002 crisis may represent such an opting out.127
As a result, pressure builds until it erupts sharply in the twin scourge of
higher premiums and greatly increased reserves. While these two steps staunch
the insurance industry’s bleeding, they do so by transferring the financial pain to
119. HARRINGTON, supra note 101, at 120.
120. Id.
121. See BAKER I, supra note 88, at 57 (stating that herd behavior is a partial explanation).
122. HUNTER ET AL., supra note 10, at 16–18.
123. James Lynch, FCAS MAAA, Chief Actuary, P/C Industry Overview and Outlook, Presentation
at Buckeye Actuarial Continuing Education 25 (Oct. 19, 2018) (presentation available at
https://www.iii.org/presentation/p-c-industry-overview-and-outlook-101818).
124. BAKER I, supra note 88, at 50; Baker II, supra note 89, at 394, 414.
125. BAKER I, supra note 88, at 50, 54 (“[T]he insurance industry systematically underreserved in the
years leading up to the [1986] crisis.”); Baker II, supra note 89, at 414, 394 (explaining how policies are
under-reserved and how there is a delay in adjusting premiums).
126. BAKER I, supra note 88, at 51–52.
127. Milt Freudenheim, St. Paul Cos. Exits Medical Malpractice Insurance, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13,
2001),
https://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/13/business/st-paul-cos-exits-medical-malpracticeinsurance.html.
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physicians and hospitals who, in turn, are shocked and angered by the sudden
and dramatic increases in their malpractice insurance premiums. When they are
told that plaintiff’s attorneys and runaway juries are to blame, health care
providers add their considerable credibility and political power to that of the
insurance industry and lobby for tort reform.
Yet, the explosive force of a malpractice hard market is usually a product
of prior underpricing (and its companion, under-reserving), not a sharp increase
in claims costs.128 In the prelude to both the 1986 and 2002 hard markets, real
indemnity payments had been rising, but only gradually and steadily.129 In
addition, interest rates on investments were declining before the 2002 hard
market.130 These factors put gradual pressure on the soft market’s low premiums.
Yet, those pressures were ignored and able to reach crisis levels because insurers
delayed raising premiums. Eventually the cork popped, and prices
skyrocketed.131
Because hard markets arise out of gradually increasing pressure on profits,
they can occur even in times like ours—when claims and payments are at
historically low levels. The pressure on profits that builds in advance of each
hard market can be caused by negative changes in any of the MPL sector’s major
streams of revenue or expenses. The dark magic of the insurance cycle is that it
converts gradual declines in revenue and gradual increases in expenses into
sudden and steep price increases. This suddenness disrupts the business models
of the policyholders, especially doctors in high litigation specialties, like
neurosurgery and obstetrics, whose premiums jump the most.132
The practice of under-reserving also plays an important role in the volatility
of the insurance cycle; it is intimately tied to the problem of underpricing.133 As
the market shifts from soft to hard and premiums begin to rise, underwriters not
only raise the reserve levels for new policies, but they also correct the underreserving that took place in the final years of a soft market in order to keep
premiums down.134 The readjustment of reserves is especially momentous in the
MPL sector because its long tail of open policies leaves a large volume of

128. See BAKER I, supra note 88,. at 53–54 (showing—in Chart 1—losses increasing gradually, rather
than spiking).
129. See supra Fig. 4 (showing steady growth in nominal payouts from 1975 to 2001).
130. HARRINGTON, supra note 101, at 102.
131. Baker II, supra note 89, at 436 (noting that price spikes are simply an integral part of the insurance
cycle).
132. BAKER I, supra note 88, at 46.
133. Id. at 56. As Bakers observes, underpricing and under-reserving go hand in hand and set the stage
for the tectonic shift. Id.
134. See HARRINGTON, supra note 101, at 103, 133 (stating that loss estimates must be adjusted
upward).
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business open to reassessment.135 The combination of larger reserves on new
policies and readjustment of reserves on old policies explains why incurred
losses rose so quickly during the lead into the 2002 hard market.136
The aforementioned readjustment has multiple effects. First, profits
plummet because the sums set aside as reserves, count against income. As Baker
says, “profits fall off a cliff”—at least until the catch-up reserves conclude and
the premium spikes have had their impact.137 This sharp drop in profits—albeit
brief—increases the surface credibility of regulatory requests for premium
increases and tort reform.138 Consumer advocates even argue that over-reserving
is intended to manipulate regulators.139 According to the CFA, “the reserve
increases in the years 2001–04 could have accounted for 60 percent of the price
increases witnessed by doctors during the period.”140
Second, reserve readjustments push premiums up higher than necessary to
pay the predicted cost of new policies since premiums must also be raised to fund
additional reserves on old policies. Conceptually, the insurance companies
should not possess the market power to charge customers for past losses.141 New
competitors, who lack those losses, can then underprice them. However, the MPL
market has barriers to swift market entry that allow existing carriers to do catchup pricing.142 As a result, reserving practices push premiums higher than
anticipated losses require, thus magnifying the disruptiveness of the shift to a
hard market.
Third, the shift in reserve practices helps fund the coming soft market. In
each of the three prior MPL hard markets, insurers set aside more reserves than
was ultimately required to pay claims.143 This consistency suggests that the
systematic optimism of the soft market is replaced by systemic pessimism when
a soft market turns hard. This pessimism pushes premium hikes and reserves setasides higher than necessary to cover the actual operating costs. The silver lining
is that these excess reserves can be released during the second half of the soft
market to maintain profits, even as companies cut premiums to chase market
share and revenue to invest.

135. BAKER I, supra note 88, at 50; Baker II, supra note 89, at 399, 408; HARRINGTON, supra note
101, at 103.
136. See supra Fig. 7.
137. BAKER I, supra note 88, at 50.
138. HUNTER ET AL., supra note 10, at 4.
139. Id.
140. HUNTER & DOROSHOW, supra note 62, at 10.
141. Baker II, supra note 89, at 414.
142. Id. at 413–14.
143. See BAKER I, supra note 88, at 54 (noting overprediction of losses); HARRINGTON, supra note
105, at 103 (showing in fig.4 that reported incurred losses rose far above actual developed losses before
the 1986 and 2002 hard markets).
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As a practical matter, these reserving practices are hidden from legislators
and journalists as they are not listed separately in the usual media reports of
industry profitability. Instead, reserves are counted as losses and included in the
industry’s count of “incurred losses.”144 To the uninitiated, the sharp increase in
incurred losses that surfaces during the initial years of a hard market gives the
mistaken impression that claims payments have skyrocketed. In actuality,
reserves have skyrocketed.145 The extra reserves are just projections—human
estimates of future losses.146 These predictions are subject to all the ordinary
human biases, including systematic optimism of the soft market and the overly
pessimistic turn of the hard market.147
Ironically, the spiked premiums and growing reserves virtually guarantee
high profits in the years immediately following the hard market’s peak.148 In fact,
high profits are how Finch defines a hard market.149 After the 2002–04 crisis, for
example, the sector posted “record profits in 2007.”150
Part IV will tackle the question of whether pressure is building for the next
hard market.
IV. ARE WE ON THE VERGE OF A CRISIS?
The medical malpractice market is unquestionably hardening. Profitability
is at its lowest level since the last hard market.151 Premiums are climbing. Market
forecasts are overwhelmingly negative.152 Industry experts fear that COVID-19
will make matters worse. Their prognosis is so sour that they have already chosen
the villain for this hard market: “social inflation.”153 Still, we may have time to
avoid a full-scale crisis.

144. See Julia Kagan, Losses Incurred (July 23, 2021), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/lossesincurred.asp (last visited Dec. 1, 2021) (stating that incurred losses include “changes to loss reserves”).
145. See supra Fig. 7 and accompanying text.
146. See supra text accompanying notes 103–117.
147. See supra text accompanying notes 103–117.
148. Fitzpatrick, supra note 93, at 256; INS. INFO. INST., https://www.iii.org/publications/commercialinsurance/how-it-functions/market-conditions-cycles-and-costs (last visited Apr. 22, 2021) (“The
prospect of higher profits draws more capital into the marketplace, leading to more competition and the
inevitable down phase of the cycle.”).
149. See The Property/Casualty Underwriting Cycle, supra note 23 (equating high profits with a hard
market). A hard market in the broad U.S. industry, with market conditions consistent with returns on
capital above required rates, represents an uncommon occurrence.” Id.
150. HUNTER & DOROSHOW, supra note 62, at 11 (citing Solid Underwriting Undercut by MPLI’s
Investment Losses, in AM BEST: BEST’S SPECIAL REPORT (2009)).
151. See supra Fig. 1 and infra Fig. 8.
152. See supra text accompanying notes 20–34.
153. See supra notes 35–36.
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A. The Long Soft Market is Ending
Between 2006 and 2015, health care insurers and their policyholders
enjoyed a long soft market. In the beginning and middle of that market, premiums
and profits were extremely high and reserves had grown quite dramatically.154
As a result, the MPL industry enjoyed “decades of soft market conditions,
driving competition for buyers and insurers.” 155 That competition led to “[l]ow
premiums, abundant capacity, and relaxed underwriting guidelines” which
“allowed insurers to aggressively compete for increased market share.”156
Industry premiums steadily fell in unadjusted dollars until 2017.157 For a while,
insurers’ large reserves allowed them to preserve profitability by gradually
releasing reserves into income.
By 2014–16, the soft market was coming to an end. The sector’s operating
costs finally rose above its premium revenues. NAIC data show that underwriting
profit had turned to underwriting loss in 2016, as shown in Figure 8. Unlike
“profit on insurance,” “underwriting profit” does not include investment gains,
thus revealing that premiums have fallen below operating expenses.158 The
dotted line, which shows profit from insurance transactions, takes investment
returns into account. AM Best, too, reported that MPL has experienced
“aggregate underwriting losses in the past four years.”159

154. See supra Fig. 1, Fig. 7.
155. Jones et al., supra note 70, at 9.
156. Id.
157. E.g., Forray & Karls, supra note 23, at fig. 1. Loss of market to self-insurance could account for
some of that decline. Id.
158. NAIC, PROFITABILITY 2020, supra note 28.
159. AM BEST, supra note 28, at 6.
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Moreover, the combined ratio, another frequently cited profitability metric,
went negative even earlier, in 2014.160 Like the other metrics, it compares
operating costs to premium revenue, but takes dividends into account. Thus, it
shows a slightly more negative outlook than underwriting profits.161 Both ratios
indicate that the medical malpractice insurance business is not currently paying
its own operating expenses and has not done so for several years.162
Only the industry’s investment returns have kept the sector profitable, as
indicated on the dotted line in Figure 8, which shows profit from insurance
transactions, a metric which considers investment income.163 But by 2019, that
measure of profitability had decreased to 2 percent. If this downward trend
continues,164 profit on insurance transactions will soon fall into negative
territory—a place last visited in the hard market of 2002.
In addition, industry sources say that reserves have been steadily shrinking
and now offer less protection against low operating profits.165 That, too, is
consistent with the end of a soft market.166 In 2020, NAIC delivered a negative
assessment:
Since 2014, the medical professional liability line has generated
negative underwriting results due to rising loss costs and diminishing
prior year reserve takedowns. For the current year, the combined ratio
worsened 8.0-points to 112.2%—a 10-year high. Results could
continue to worsen as medical professionals may have increased
liability exposure related to COVID-19.167
Finally, industry experts detect growing pressure for the industry to raise
premiums.168 In 2019, the Journal of Risk and Insurance lamented that “The
Reckoning is Here for the Medical Professional Liability Market,” noting “a
decade’s worth of price erosion.”169 Leo Carroll, the Senior Vice President and

160. NAIC, PROPERTY 2020, supra note 29, at 7.
161. Combined ratios turned negative somewhere between 2014 to 2016 depending on the data source,
as shown in fig.13.
162. Id.
163. NAIC, PROFITABILITY 2020, supra note 28.
164. See supra Fig. 8.
165. AM BEST, supra note 28, at 9.
166. Id. at 5
167. NAIC, PROPERTY 2020, supra note 29, at 6. Page 7 shows a negative combined ratio since 2014.
Id. at 7.
168. Amy Buttell, Reinsurers Adjust to the Hardening Market, Pandemic: Nuclear verdicts, depressed
margins weigh on industry, INSIDE MED. LIAB. (2020).
169. See Dwyer, supra note 21 (stating that rates are increasing for providers, but especially for
hospitals); José R. Guardado, Policy Research Perspectives: Med. Prof. Liab. Ins. Pemiums: An Overview
of the Market from 2010 to 2019, in AM. MED. ASS’N POL’Y RSCH. PERSPS. 4 (American Medical
Association ed., 2020), https://www.ama-assn.org/system/files/2020-02/prp-mlm-premiums.pdf
[hereinafter Guardado I] (indicating that 26.5% of surveyed physicians reported increased premiums in
2019, the most since 2006, while only 5.1% of reported decreased premiums, the lowest in 10 years.”).
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Head of Healthcare at Berkeley Hathaway Specialty Insurance, concluded that
the industry had waited too long to respond to its profitability challenges:
Over the past several years, there has been a good deal of rationalizing
and failure to timely respond to about deteriorating conditions and
poor results, and a reluctance to make corrections needed for the
overall health of the marketplace. Now we’re reaching a point where
the industry is behind, and serious improvements are necessary.170
AM Best’s 2020 report found that “MPL insurers have been feeling rate
pressure for several years.”171 The widely used national survey of physicians by
Medical Liability Monitor found that the transition had already begun. In 2019,
26.5% of surveyed physicians reported increased premiums after a long period
of being stable or even falling.172 Similarly, a recent panel of experts urged
caution “as claims increase and medical malpractice insurance rates surge.”173
Jean-Paul Rebillard, the president of a unit of Berkshire Hathaway, opined that
“we find ourselves at an inflection point in the market cycle.”174
A report from the Medical Professional Liability Association (MPLA)
supports these observations, stating that “[r]ates began to increase in 2019 and
are likely to continue to increase at a faster clip in 2020. Certain markets may
see double-digit rate increases.”175 A 2019 report from the American Society for
Health Care Risk Management (ASHRM) and Aon concluded that most hospitals
“have benefited from years of declining rates, combined with significant
exposure increase. However, this is not sustainable in the current
marketplace.”176
The price increases being reported by policyholders are starting to appear
in figures for industry premium volume as well. Premium volume began to rise
in 2018 and continued to rise in 2019 and 2020.177 AM Best found that premiums
collected from physicians grew in 2019, even though physicians migrated to

170. Dwyer, supra note 21.
171. AM BEST, supra note 28, at 5.
172. Guardado I, supra note 169, at 4.
173. Gavin Souter, Captive Owners React to Hardening Medical Malpractice Market, BUS. INS. (Jan.
28,
2020,
6:04
PM
CST),
https://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20200128/NEWS06/912332796/Captive-owners-react-tohardening-medical-malpractice-market-World-Captive-Forum.
174. Id.
175. Forray & Karls, supra note 23, at 47.
176. Jones et al., supra note 70, at 14.
177. NATL. ASS’N. OF INSURANCE COMM’RS, COUNTRYWIDE SUMMARY OF MED. PROF. LIAB. INS.,
CALENDAR YEARS 2005–2019, at 1 (2020); NATL. ASS’N. OF INSURANCE COMM’RS, COUNTRYWIDE
SUMMARY OF MED. PROF. LIAB. INS, CALENDAR YEARS 2004–2018, at 1 (2019); Medical Malpractice
Loss Trends: Data at a Glance, CIPR NEWSLETTER (Center for Insurance Policy Research, NAIC), Aug.
2015, at 19–20; Data at a Glance, CIPR NEWSLETTER (Center for Insurance Policy Research, NAIC)
July, 2013, at 29–30; AM BEST, supra note 28, at Ex. 2. See supra Fig. 7 (showing AM Best data on
premiums for entire industry); Forray & Karls, supra note 23, at 47.
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hospital employment in 2019, suggesting that premium rates—not just premiums
collected—are climbing.178
Recently, the AMA released the results of a 2020 survey of physicians by
the Medical Liability. In 2020, 31.1% reported an increase in premiums—more
than any year since 2005.179 Because the increase follows jumps of 13.7% in
2018 and 26.5% in 2019,180 the AMA concluded the current upward trend is one
“not seen in over 20 years.” Although these numbers are still much lower than
the rate of increase that occurred in the thick of the last crisis, the AMA saw the
“early stages of a hard market.”181
Today, redundant reserves are dwindling, premiums are starting to inch
upward, and profits are near zero even after taking investment gains into account.
Thus, the market for medical malpractice insurance is hardening. So, what are
the factors that are driving profits down? Can we have a soft landing? And
finally, what role will the pandemic play in the severity of this hard market?
B. What Is Driving Profits Down?
Insurance industry profits are driven by the industry’s major expenses and
income streams. Sustained adverse trends for any combination of them can put
material pressure on premiums. This Section B searches for the factors
contributing most heavily to the industry’s recent decade of declining profits,
looking first at revenue sources and then at expenses.
1. Inadequate Premiums
About four years after the hard market of 2002 began, premiums began to
steadily decline until 2018.182 Cumulatively, premiums declined 35% since 2006
in adjusted dollars and 22% in unadjusted dollars, as shown above in Figure 7.183
According to the MLPA, “premium decreased by $1.1 billion between 2006 and
2016—approximately 20% of the premium written at the beginning of that
decade.”184 “To put that in perspective,” observed the MPLA, “consider that in

178. AM BEST, supra note 28, at 5; Forray & Karls, supra note 23, at 47 (“Declining rate levels were
only one factor driving premium decreases during this time frame. Also contributing to the lower level of
premium was the loss of business to self-insurance mechanisms. Throughout this time frame, MPL
companies lost business due to healthcare system acquisitions of both hospitals and physician practices,
which typically then joined the self-insurance mechanisms of these systems.”).
179. Medical Library Market Research, AM. MED. ASS’N, https://www.ama-assn.org/
practice-management/sustainability/medical-liability-market-research (last visited May 5, 2021); Jose R.
Guardado, Policy Research Perspectives, in AM. MED. ASS’N 2 (2021), https://www.amaassn.org/system/files/2021-03/prp-mlm-premiums-2020.pdf [hereinafter Guardado II].
180. Guardado II, supra note 179, at 2.
181. Medical Library Market Research, supra note 179, at 3.
182. See supra Fig. 7.
183. See supra Fig. 7.
184. Forray & Karls, supra note 23, at 47.
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the 40-year history of the MPL industry no other period of decreasing premium
has lasted longer than two years and the greatest consecutive-year premium
reduction was 7%.”185
At first, indemnity payments were shrinking in equal amounts, so profits
remained near record highs despite the decline in premiums.186 But the sharp
decline in payouts ended in 2011.187 At about the same time, paid losses and
operating expenses both began to rise gradually in nominal (unadjusted)
dollars.188 Nevertheless, premiums continued to drop in nominal dollars until
2018 and then rose only modestly.189 Because premiums did not rise despite the
growth of both paid losses and operating costs, all three profit ratios began a
steady decline in 2011 that has continued with little interruption to the most
recent reporting period.190 True to the textbook insurance cycle, the industry has
allowed pressure on premiums to build.191
2. Exhaustion of Surplus Reserves
The industry maintained its profitability during the last half of this soft
market, in part, by releasing redundant reserves.192 However, releases have been
getting smaller over the past few years; the Industry Trade Association concluded
that “redundant reserves have been depleted.”193 According to AM Best, “reserve
releases will no longer be sufficient to prop up the segment’s calendar year
results.194 Berkshire Hathaway executive Leo Carroll put it another way:
“[r]eserve redundancies are diminishing from prior years, so the market is no
longer able to mask actual current year results.”195
According to AM Best’s calculations, over two-thirds of the deterioration
of the combined ratio in 2019 was attributable to the release of fewer reserves.196
If not for that release of reserves, the industry would have fallen into the red.197
These facts justify the conclusion that shrinking reserve redundancies are a

185. Id.
186. See supra Fig. 1, Fig. 7.
187. See supra Fig. 1, Fig. 7.
188. See supra Fig. 1, Fig. 7.
189. See supra Fig. 7 (showing that the sole outlier year was 2011).
190. See supra Fig. 1.
191. See supra Part IV.B.4 (discussing payouts and premiums).
192. Forray & Karls, supra note 23, at 49.
193. Id.
194. AM BEST, supra note 28, at 9.
195. Dwyer, supra note 21.
196. See AM BEST, supra note 28, at 8 (accounting for 8 points of an 11-point drop) and 9 (noting
“erosion of reserve redundancies”).
197. Forray & Karls, supra note 23, at 49 (“[T]he operating ratio of 97% would have pierced 100%,
making the industry unprofitable.”).

PETERS 04 (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

ON THE CUSP OF THE NEXT MED. MAL. INURANCE CRISIS

2/9/22 3:48 PM

159

significant contributor to declining industry profits. Their apparent exhaustion
will greatly increase the mounting pressure to raise premium rates significantly.
3. Declining Investment Returns
NAIC data show a gradual decline in investment returns over the past
fifteen years. Returns on the investment of reserves dropped from a high of 18–
19% of premiums in the early years of the soft market to 13–14% in the last
several years, with large one-time dips in 2008 and 2016.198 These weakening
returns probably contributed to the decline in profits over the past decade.
Nevertheless, declining premiums and depleted reserve redundancies likely
played a more important role.
4. Rising Indemnity Payments
After declining for a decade, total inflation-adjusted payouts reported by
the NPDB stabilized in 2010 and began to rise again in 2018–19, when the total
amount rose slightly more than the consumer price index.199 According to AM
Best, indemnity payments have grown 20% in nominal dollars since 2011 (about
3% annually), but have been predominantly flat over the past decade after they
are indexed to reflect the medical purchasing power of the settlements.200 CRICO
also found that increases fell below the rate of medical inflation.201
Though the recent increases are explained by inflation, they are nonetheless
a potential source of pressure on profits because premiums were not raised to
reflect this expense. S&P Global, a business consulting company, explicitly
noted the sector’s failure to account for inflation, stating that “[p]erhaps the fact
that losses are now piercing the excess casualty layer is more of a function of
general inflationary loss experience rather than rising social inflation.”202 Thus,
the recent gradual inflation of indemnity payments has put pressure on profits
because the industry has chosen not to pass them on to its customers; instead, the
pressure is being allowed to build.
5. Rising Costs of Defending, Underwriting and Selling
The cost of selling policies and defending claims has grown slowly but
steadily over the past decade as a percentage of premiums. The combination of
internal claims adjustment and outside defense cost is called the loss adjustment
198. NAIC, PROFITABILITY 2020, supra note 28; NAIC, PROFITABILITY 2008, at 38; NAIC,
PROFITABILITY 2016, at 38.
199. See supra Fig. 3.
200. See supra text accompanying note 32 (describing nominal payment data).
201. CIRCO STRATEGIES, supra note 49.
202. HUNTER ET AL., supra note 10, at 18. BEST also places some of the responsibility on medical
inflation. AM BEST, supra note 28, at 7 (“Rising medical loss costs . . . had pressured loss and LAE ratios
over the last few years.”).
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expense (LAE).203 According to NAIC, LAE consumed 7.3 more cents of every
premium dollar in 2019 than it did in 2010.204 Costs of selling insurance also
rose, consuming an extra 3.2 cents of each premium dollar.205 Together, they
accounted for about ten points in the drop of the underwriting profit ratio, which
fell twenty-four points between 2010 and 2018 and another eleven points in
2019.206
By 2019, defense costs consumed a remarkable 30% of every premium
dollar and selling expenses used 12%.207 Because these figures represent the
portion of premiums consumed by these expenses, some of the increase could
simply be a function of declining premiums. However, the rest—perhaps, the
bulk—represents an actual increase in costs. Those increasing costs put
additional pressure on profits in the absence of rising premiums. Yet, premiums
steadily declined.208
6. Adding It All Up
Although claims are substantially below their peak in 2001–02 and real
payouts are stable, profits are under stress and premiums are expected to rise.
The key cause is a long-standing and intensely competitive market in which
insurers did not believe that they could risk raising premiums despite several
worrisome trends which should have led them to do so.
Since 2010, the industry has seen an increase in defense costs and sales
costs, the exhaustion of reserve redundancies, a decline in investment returns,
and the ongoing impact of medical inflation on indemnity payments; yet real
premium volume still mirrors the level it was at in 2000. AM Best reached the
following conclusions about current pressures on profitability:
The deterioration in underwriting results [in 2019] was due primarily
to a slight rise in underwriting expenses and losses and loss adjustment
expenses (LAE), along with an 11% drop in net premiums earned
(NPE) . . . Rising medical loss costs, along with relentlessly
challenging and competitive market conditions, had pressured loss
and LAE ratios over the last few years, before an even larger increase
in 2019.209

203. Loss
Adjustment
Expense
Law
and
Legal
Definition,
USLEGAL,
https://definitions.uslegal.com/l/loss-adjustment-expense/ (last visited Nov. 21, 2021).
204. See NAIC, PROFITABILITY 2010, at 38; NAIC, PROFITABILITY 2019, at 40.
205. NAIC, PROFITABILITY 2020, supra note 28. Data from AM BEST cover fewer years but show a
similar upward trend in underwriting expenses. See AM BEST, supra note 28, at Ex. 5 (underwriting
expense ratios increasing from 23.7% in 2015 to 25.6% in 2019).
206. See supra Fig. 8.
207. NAIC, PROFITABILITY 2020, supra note 28.
208. See supra Part IV.B.1.
209. AM BEST, supra note 28, at 5–7.
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The AM Best study concluded that “reserve releases will no longer be
sufficient to prop up the segment’s calendar year results.”210 Consequently,
prices will need to rise.211
The MPL sector may once again have waited too long to raise its premiums.
Industry defenders contend that there is always considerable guesswork in
determining when a soft market has ended.212 For example, Investopedia says
“[m]ost insurance industry watchdog organizations believe that underwriting
cycles are inevitable due to the inherent uncertainty of matching insurance prices
to future losses.”213 However, the analysis untaken in this article shows that
carriers now have the tools to recognize the signs and to determine when prudent
preventive action should be taken.214
After the 2002 hard market, Lloyd identified the insurance cycle as the top
challenge facing the insurance industry and undertook an extensive study.215 In
a 2006 report Managing the Insurance Cycle, it identified seven key steps,
including the following two:
[1] Don’t follow the herd. Insurers need to be prepared to walk away
from markets when prices fall below a prudent, risk-based premium
. . . [2] Get smarter with underwriter and manager incentives.
Incentives for key staff should be structured to reward efficient
deployment of capital, linking such rewards to target shareholder
returns rather than volume growth.216
Both recommendations emphasize better market discipline when prices are
falling too low, including the removal of employee incentives to prioritize market
share over profitability.
Rolf Tolle, Lloyd’s Director of Franchise Performance, added that, “[i]n
the past, insurers have simply accepted the insurance cycle, seeing it as a force
of nature with an uncontrollable impact on their business.217 But at Lloyd’s we
believe that insurers now have the information and the tools they need to manage

210. Id. MPLA also emphasized the impact of depletion of redundant reserves. Forray & Karls, supra
note 23, at 48.
211. Id. at 9 (“pricing will be needed to generate improved calendar year underwriting results”).
212. See supra note 111 (laying out the many sources of uncertainty).
213. Julia
Kagan,
Underwriting
Cycle,
INVESTOPEDIA
(July
31,
2021),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/u/underwriting-cycle.asp.
214. Several other commentators have called for more discipline from carriers in underwriting and
pricing. Id.
215. Seven Steps to Managing the Cycle, INSURANCE-CANADA.CA (July 12, 2006),
https://www.insurance-canada.ca/2006/07/12/seven-steps-managing-cycle/.
216. Id. The seven steps are: don’t follow the heard, invest in the latest risk management tools, don’t
let surplus capital dictate your underwriting, don’t be dazzled by higher investment return, don’t rely on
‘the big one’ to push prices upwards, redeploy capital from lines where margins are unsustainable, and
get smarter with underwriter and manager incentives. Id.
217. Id. (quoting Rolf Tolle).

PETERS 04 (DO NOT DELETE)

162

JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY

2/9/22 3:48 PM

[VOL. 25:1

the cycle much more effectively.”218 Tolle concluded that “[t]here is nothing
complex about the cycle. It is about having the courage of your convictions to
act with strength.”219 Similarly, Investopedia observed that “[t]he underwriting
cycle perpetuates because a majority of insurance companies place short-term
gains over long-term stability without concern for what happens when the soft
market ends.”220
However, the insurers who are first to raise premiums are likely to lose
customers.221 Lloyds believes that carriers should walk away from a line of
business when these conditions are present. However, the CFA and the CJ&D
offer a different solution—more regulatory scrutiny during rate setting,
especially during the transition into a hard market; but only a few states have
taken that step.222 New York reportedly experienced some success moderating
the cycle by limiting price increases in hard markets and price decreases in soft
markets.223 While more experimentation of this kind is needed, New York
unfortunately ended its efforts in 2004. As a third option, Tom Baker and I each
proposed adopting exclusive enterprise liability.224 Shifting tort liability
exclusively to hospitals and integrated health care organizations will transfer
liability to parties who are better able to buffer themselves against the disruptions
of the insurance cycle. Collective enterprise liability will also spare high-risk
specialists from shouldering a disproportionate share of the health care system’s
liability costs. It might also dampen the extraordinary anger felt by the physicians
who practice in those specialties. At present, the industry is gradually evolving
in this direction,225 but it’s not clear whether the trend will continue.226
The fourth and most appealing option is self-insurance for health care
organizations that can afford it; an organization which insures itself and its
providers is no longer subject to the cycle because the organization is not
competing in the insurance market and, thus, is not facing existential pressure to
218. Id.
219. Insurance Cycle, HANDWIKI, https://handwiki.org/wiki/Insurance cycle (last visited Mar. 21,
2021).
220. Kagan, supra note 213.
221. BAKER I, supra note 88, at 57.
222. See EMILY GOTTLIEB & JOANNE DOROSHOW, BRIEFING BOOK MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: BY THE
NUMBERS 71–73 (2020) (describing laws in California and Illinois). AM Best also recommends
innovation to reduce defense costs. AM BEST, supra note 28, at 23.
223. Id.
224. BAKER I, supra note 88, at
225. See Carol K. Kane, Recent Changes in Physician Practice Arrangements: Private Practice
Dropped to Less Than 50 Percent of Physicians in 2020 in AM. MED. ASS’N POL’Y RSCH. PERSPS. 7–8
(American Medical Association ed., 2021) [hereinafter Kane I] (indicating that in 2020, 50.2% of
physicians were employees and 40% worked for hospitals).
226. Carol K. Kane, Policy Research Perspectives Updated Data on Physician Practice
Arrangements: For the First Time, Fewer Physicians are Owners Than Employees in AM. MED. ASS’N
POL’Y RSCH. PERSPS. 7 (American Medical Association ed., 2019) [hereinafter Kane II] (“[C]aution
should be taken in assuming current trends will continue indefinitely”).
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match price cuts. Instead, each health care system can raise and lower its reserves
each year to reflect the ebb and flow of its claims experience, expenses, and
investment returns. Consequently, the organization is no longer faced with
periodic inexplicable spikes in premiums.
In the meantime, however, the insurance cycle continues. Brief explosive
corrections follow periods of cutthroat competition and widespread
underpricing.227 The market is on the verge of that transition once again. Gradual
growth in all expenses (including underwriting, selling, defending, and
indemnifying), coupled with a gradual decline in all revenue streams (premiums,
reserve releases, and investment returns) places growing and continuing pressure
on profits.
C. Will There Be a Soft Landing?
Despite a hardening market, some industry representatives believe that risk
of a crisis is lower today than immediately before the crisis of 2002. For example,
Bill Burns and Alyssa Gittleman of the global investment management firm
Conning, highlight increased policyholder surplus and the prominence in
reinsurance coverage today in comparison to the market in 2002.228
Reinsurance hedges against losses and frees up capital to write more
insurance contracts.229 Its increased use today should provide some protection
for retail carriers to the modest extent that indemnity payments drive the loss of
profits.230
Policyholder surplus also provides a margin of safety against unexpected
losses. In a publicly held company, this is called equity or net worth.231 In 2019,
the MPL sector’s unrealized capital gains lifted industry surplus about 4.3% to
$18.8 billion, despite the existence of an underwriting loss for the year.232
According to data from the MPLA, policyholder surplus is three times larger
today than it was in 2001.233 Theoretically, these surpluses could be used to
227. See supra Part III.
228. Medical Liability Monitor’s 2019 Annual Rate Survey Indicates a Medical Malpractice Insurance
Premiums Rising, But Are We Headed for a Real Hard Market, PRWEB (Oct. 3, 2019),
https://www.prweb.com/releases/medical_liability_monitors_2019_annual_rate_survey_indicates_a_me
dical_malpractice_insurance_premiums_rising_but_are_we_headed_for_a_real_hard_market/prweb166
17262.htm. At the same time, the authors acknowledge some similarities to 2002 such as the MPL
industry’s operating ratio, return on equity, declining loss reserve margins, use of schedule credits and
declining competition. Id.
229. Caroline
Banton,
Reinsurance,
INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/reinsurance.asp (July 30, 2020).
230. However, anecdotal accounts of reinsurers leaving the MPL sector have surfaced. See Buttell,
supra note 35 (interviewing Andy Firth, president of MIEC, a mutual MPL insurer).
231. AM BEST, supra note 28, at 11–12.
232. Id. In MPLA’s annual survey, surplus rose about three percent in 2019 from about $13.6 billion
to $14.0 billion despite the year’s underwriting losses. Forray & Karls, supra note 23, at 49.
233. Forray & Karls, supra note 23, at 49.
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temper the shift to a hard market. In publicly held companies, however, this
strategy would shift some of the cost of a hard market onto shareholders, making
its use less likely.
The current capital capacity of the MPL sector may also soften the landing.
So far, the sector has avoided the departure of major carriers from the market.
This contrasts with 2002–03, when St. Paul Fire and Marine stopped selling
malpractice insurance.234 St Paul was the largest carrier in the market and
stranded over forty-thousand physicians.235 In 2003, Farmers Insurance
Company exited the market as well.236 Thereafter, “the market stiffened up and
prices went up.”237 Nothing on a similar scale has occurred in recent years.
The MPLA also identifies other factors which could temper the transition.
For example, lower claims frequency levels in today’s market “ha[ve] put MPL
rates in a better position than they were 20 years ago” and “the degree of rate
inadequacy [is] less, and present in fewer locales, in this most recent soft market
than in the previous soft market.”238 The authors of that report, Forray and Karls,
further explain:
In the early 2000s, the start of the hard market was steep and quick,
with double-digit rate increases common across states and carriers. In
contrast, rate increases in the emerging hard market are expected to be
smaller and to vary more across markets. As noted earlier, recent rate
inadequacies have been less—both in magnitude and geographic
spread—than in the preceding soft market of the late 1990s, placing
less pressure on rates now.239
“What makes the last ten years different,” adds AM Best, “is that the
deterioration [in underwriting profits] has been gradual rather than sudden.”240
In addition, the COVID-19 pandemic may make it politically inexpedient
for insurance companies to dramatically raise premiums for physicians and
hospitals. This public relations obstacle could force carriers to use their available
surplus to subsidize more gradual increases in premiums than would otherwise
occur.

234. Shryock, supra note 69.
235. Bruce Japsen, Why Doctor Malpractice Premiums Stopped Rising, FORBES (Oct. 10, 2018, 8:46
AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/brucejapsen/2018/10/10/why-doctor-malpractice-premiums-stoppedrising/?sh=603e0711517b; Charles A. Wilhoite & Scott R. Miller, The Transitioning Medical
Professional Liability Market—Challenges in Valuing a Medical Professional Liability Company,
WILLAMETTE MGMT. ASSOCS.: INSIGHTS 85 (Summer 2013).
236. Wilhoite & Miller, supra note 235, at 85, 86.
237. Shryock, supra note 69.
238. Forray & Karls, supra note 23, at 48, 50.
239. Id. MPLA qualifies its hope for a soft landing by warning that “certain market segments are likely
to experience double-digit rate increases during 2020 and perhaps 2021.” Id. at 50.
240. AM BEST, supra note 28, at 13.
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Finally, the most hopeful sign of a softer landing is the widespread
recognition of the danger at a relatively early moment in the turn from a soft to
a hard market. Figure 8, above, shows that the difference between the gradual
profit decrease from 2010 to the present has not yet reached the deep losses that
occurred in 2002.241 At the end of 2019, the sector also maintained a positive
return on net worth, as shown in Figure 9, below. Both metrics fell much further
during the last hard market.242 The current moderate decrease suggests that the
MPL sector may have time to raise premiums and reserves gradually, rather than
steeply. And the current cross-talk about social inflation encourages sector-wide
price increases, rather than risky, individual actions.

In late 2019, Bill Fleming, the chief operating officer for The Doctors
Company, the nation’s largest physician-owned medical malpractice insurer,
averred:
[I]f we don’t raise rates a little bit when it’s necessary, that builds up
pressure that eventually results in a large increase, which is very
disruptive from a customer perspective. Our hope and expectation is
that a small increase is more tolerable over time than a single large
increase . . . I think the industry needs to find a way to take reasonable
increases that can be absorbed into practices and health systems rather
than continue to defer the need to a time when you have no choice but
to take a very large increase that’s disruptive not just to the
marketplace, but to practices all over the country.243
In short, the market may experience a softer landing in the coming years
than it did during the 2002 shift due to lower payout levels, gradual rather than
sudden profit erosions, increased reinsurance utilization, substantially larger
industry surplus, current politics, and early warnings. However, the impact of the
COVID-19 pandemic on malpractice litigation remains a wild card.
241. See infra Fig. 8; AM BEST, supra note 28, at 13.
242. See supra Fig. 9.
243. Shryock, supra note 69.

PETERS 04 (DO NOT DELETE)

166

2/9/22 3:48 PM

JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY

[VOL. 25:1

D. The Wild Card: COVID-19
The possibility of an insurance crisis is amplified by the uncertainty
resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic. Both NAIC and AM Best believe the
pandemic poses a serious risk to the industry.244 They worry that COVID-19
exigencies have impacted medical professionals’ ability to provide effective
care, both to COVID-19 patients and to elective patients whose care schedules
were altered or relegated to telemedicine.245
AM Best thoroughly examined the risks posed by the pandemic. Its
assessment is very pessimistic and emphasizes how providers became and have
remained overwhelmed during admission surges of patients with serious
conditions.246 The surges have caused hospital overcrowding, shortages of
intensive care beds, and the use of makeshift facilities.247 Rising patient-todoctor ratios meant that exhausted providers continuously worked more hours on
little rest.248 Delays in treatment and reliance on telemedicine became more
common, both of which raise the risk of missed diagnoses.249 In addition, the
provider shortage forced the recruitment of less experienced providers who were
not trained in the treatment of infectious diseases.250 Hospitals struggled with
inadequate supplies, staffing, and hospital space.251 Law professor Nicolas
Terry’s analysis identifies a similar set of risks and adds improvised equipment
and untested drug use.252 Each of these factors increase the likelihood of
additional medical errors.
Overall AM Best is pessimistic, concluding that the “already dim prospects
for the segment’s profitability have been clouded by COVID-19.”253 The
Medical Professional Liability Association believes the coronavirus has “brought
the arrival of a hardening market.”254
Yet, several factors could prevent a pandemic-related surge in claims. AM
Best concedes that the current sentiment toward health care providers, the
absence of a well-established standard of care, and the enactment of tort
immunity legislation may stave off an intense claim surge.255 AM Best even
244. NAIC, PROPERTY 2020, supra note 29, at 6; AM BEST, supra note 28, at 1–2, 10.
245. NAIC, PROPERTY 2020, supra note 29, at 15.
246. AM BEST, supra note 28, at 1. AM Best also worries about the impact on provider ability to pay
premiums. Id. at 3.
247. Id. at 1.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 2.
250. Id. at 1.
251. Id.
252. NICOLAS P. TERRY, ASSESSING LEGAL RESPONSES TO COVID-19, 199, 200 (Scott Burris et al.
eds., 2020) [hereinafter TERRY I].
253. AM BEST, supra note 28, at 3.
254. Forray & Karls, supra note 23, at 50.
255. AM BEST, supra note 28, at 2–3.
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speculates that “few lawyers are likely to take on lawsuits against healthcare
providers related to COVID-19, owing to healthcare provider sentiment and the
difficulties of determining the standard of care.”256
Law professor Nicholas Terry conducted a thorough review of state and
federal immunity laws and found The Public Readiness and Emergency
Preparedness Act of 2005 remains the only important, federal-level shield.257 The
act governs “covered countermeasures,” such as drugs, devices, personal
respiratory protective devices, and vaccines.258 The Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) ruled that the Act’s protections also cover the decision
against countermeasure usage, but at least one district court disagreed.259 Even if
HHS’s position is ultimately affirmed by the courts, the law still omits many of
the likely sources of adverse events, such as overcrowding, poor hygiene,
understaffing and exceeding the scope of a practitioner’s training or licensure. If
HHS is wrong, then misdiagnosis is also unprotected.
More helpful to providers are the liability shields enacted in twenty-four
states as of January 2021.260 These laws are broader because they focus on the
overall diagnosis and treatment of COVID-19,261 rather than primarily on drugs
and devices. Terry notes that these laws may protect providers who worked
beyond their scope of training or licensure.262 As a result, the state immunity
laws will preclude successful claims by many victims of COVID-related medical
negligence.
Furthermore, COVID-19 lawsuits will be difficult to win. Terry points out
that physicians will offer evidence of “extenuating circumstances at the height
of the pandemic such as emergency rooms operating well above capacity and
shortages of ICU beds and ventilators.”263 In addition, patients will often have
difficulty proving that reasonable care would have produced better outcomes.
Patients can contract COVID-19 in hospital settings even when health care
professionals take reasonable care.264 Patients can and did die in huge numbers
despite access to state of the art medical care.265 Indeed, the state of the art was
256. Id. at 2.
257. NICOLAS P. TERRY, COVID-19 POLICY PLAYBOOK: LEGAL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A SAFER,
MORE EQUITABLE FUTURE 191, 192–94 (Scott Burris et al. eds., Vol. 2, 2021) [hereinafter TERRY II].
258. Id. at 192.
259. Id. (citing Lutz v. Big Blue Healthcare, Inc, 480 F. Supp. 3d 1207 (D. Kan. 2020)).
260. Id. at 193.
261. Id.
262. Id. However, the liability shield boundaries leave many areas for interpretation, such as their
application to non-COVID patients whose care was interrupted or altered by the pandemic, and their
application to COVID patients who were injured by delays and poor hospital conditions rather than their
medical “treatment.”
263. TERRY I, supra note 252, at 201.
264. TERRY II, supra note 257, at 192.
265. See CTR. FOR SYS. SCI. & ENG’G, COVID-19 Dashboard, JOHNS HOPKINS,
https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html (Nov. 23, 2021) (reporting global deaths from COVID-19).
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often learned by trial and error. Thus, both breach of care and causation will be
difficult to prove.
At the same time, insurers and providers will benefit from pandemic’s
reduction of bad outcomes associated with elective procedures. The pandemic
effectively shut down elective care in many hospitals for several months, thereby
reducing the population of surgeries and invasive diagnostic procedures that
normally form a significant part of the malpractice caseload.266
Overall, the predictions of a wave of COVID-based litigation were likely
unduly pessimistic. Nevertheless, the uncertainties associated with the pandemic
may cause underwriters to panic. Given the fears expressed about the pandemic’s
impact on MPL insurance,267 underwriters may anticipate a surge of claims. If
they do, their prediction will drive premiums and reserves up, finalizing the turn
into a hard market, whether or not the surge of COVID cases ever materializes.
As a result, we are left waiting for the claims data from 2022, when the
earliest statutes of limitations will expire. In the interim, 2021 data on premiums
and incurred losses reserves will reveal whether insurance companies are
predicting a crisis. Incurred losses will be an especially important indicator as it
will reveal whether underwriters are rewriting reserves
V. CONCLUSION
Claims and payments are far below their peaks and are merely rising along
with inflation. Yet, insurer profits have been sinking for a decade and are nearing
negative levels. Multiple factors have contributed to the steady decline in profits,
including; declining premiums; depletion of surplus reserves; the rising costs of
selling, underwriting, and defending policies; and a recent inflation-driven
increase in payouts. Investment income has kept the sector in the black, but
barely.
At the same time, today’s insurance market differs in several important
respects from the 2002–06 hard market. The industry’s finances today are more
secure, and the start of the hard market is less sharp.268 Most importantly, carriers
are discussing the problem early in the turn from a soft market to a hard one.269
Much will turn on the use that carriers make of that information. Will carriers
risk raising premiums before absolutely forced to do so? If so, carriers may
reduce the risk of hasty over-reserving by spreading premium increases over a
larger span of years.
One crucial uncertainty is the impact of COVID-19 on claiming. At the very
least, the pandemic produced unprecedented turbulence in health care delivery.

266.
267.
268.
269.

See AM BEST, supra note 28, at 3 (noting decline in specialty work); Buttell, supra note 168.
See supra notes 243–252 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 228-245.
See supra Part II.
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COVID-19’s uncertain impact on errors and claiming places pressure on
underwriters for raising reserves and premiums. If they do, the market will
harden more painfully than would otherwise be necessary.
The stakes are high. If the medical malpractice insurance market has a hard
landing, providers and patients—not insurers—will suffer the cost, even though
the crisis resulted from industry underpricing, not a sharp increase in physician
errors or patient claims.
Insurers will tell angry doctors and hospitals that juries are to blame. Once
again, negligently injured patients will be asked to give up their rights in order
to keep physician premiums down, effectively subsidizing those premiums with
their own injuries. This article demonstrates that taking away victims’ rights will
not solve anything.
Three malpractice insurance crises have already occurred, each of which
has produced significant tort reform across the country.270 Thereafter, errors
continued unabated, but claims shrank dramatically along with redress.271
Payouts fell to historically low levels272 and the protection of patients with
meritorious cases was materially weakened by tort “reform.” But the cycles did
not end because jury awards are not the problem. Competitive strategies that keep
premiums from keeping up with inflation are the culprit. This article illustrates
how this happens and provides the information necessary to identify the true
causes of the next hard market.
As we teeter on the cusp of a fourth crisis, the industry has the tools to take
us in for a soft landing. So far, however, the talk in the industry revolves around
“nuclear verdicts” and “social inflation,” not judiciously raising premiums and
reserves in a manner that allows profits to recover without causing another crisis.
The choice is theirs. But lawmakers should not listen to calls for further tort
reform.

270. See supra notes 17–19 and accompanying text.
271. See supra Part II.
272. See supra Part II.

